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I 
INTRODUCTION 
Past research on the nature and scope of medical-malpractice claims in 
Florida has found that a very high number of cases are resolved before trial, 
and, conversely, a very low number of cases are resolved through jury trials. A 
general survey of the process of medical-malpractice claims resolution in 
Florida between 1990 and 2003 reveals that 45% of claims resulted in payments, 
46% of paid claims were closed in three years, and 96% were closed in six 
years.1 Moreover, 20% of paid claims were settled without a lawsuit ever being 
filed, and only 2.3% of paid claims were resolved following a jury trial. Out of 
all awards equal to or exceeding one million dollars, approximately 10% were 
made without a plaintiff ever filing a formal lawsuit, compared to less than 5% 
of cases resolved through jury trial.2 
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 1. See Neil Vidmar et al., Uncovering the “Invisible” Profile of Medical Malpractice Litigation: 
Insights from Florida, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 315, 329–30 (2005) [hereinafter Vidmar et al., Uncovering]. 
 2. Neil Vidmar et al., Million Dollar Medical Malpractice Cases in Florida: Post-verdict and Pre-
suit Settlements, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1343, 1345 (2006) [hereinafter Vidmar et al., Million Dollar]. 
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Numerous researchers have studied when parties in a legal dispute go to 
trial and when they settle out of court.3 These investigations—which often use 
the Pareto notion of equality4 tested with game-theoretic models—have focused 
on the strategic decision-making elements of pretrial settlements. These studies 
have found that each party’s level of information, as well as the rules of the 
game, affect the likelihood of settlement.5 The few studies that have used real 
data to examine settlement rates have found very high pretrial-settlement rates.6 
The dynamics behind these resolution rates—whether they are million-
dollar cases, lesser awards, or claims without awards—should be considered in 
the context of the discovery and procedural rules guiding the claiming process. 
A study of closed-claim files of major medical-liability insurers clearly 
demonstrates the importance of the discovery process in resolving claims.7 
Before claims can be settled, both parties need to uncover the facts bearing on 
the dispute, including both the determination of causality and the presence of 
legal negligence. Today, a patient in a hospital is often treated by multiple 
specialists, resident physicians, nurses, and technicians. At the beginning of a 
claim, no one may know if, which, and how many of these persons might have 
been negligent.8 The formal process of discovery can be difficult and time-
consuming, and undoubtedly is a primary cause of delay in the settlement of 
most disputes. 
 
 3. See, e.g., Richard Howard, Richard Chard, Joel Kaji & Jeffrey Davis, Pre-trial Bargaining and 
Litigation: The Search for Fairness and Efficiency, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 431, 434 (2000) (discussing 
literature and models about settlement). 
 4. A social condition is pareto-optimal or pareto-efficient when it is not possible to shift to 
another condition judged better by at least one person and worse by none. AMARTYA SEN, 
COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE 21 (1970). 
 5. See Alison Watts, Bargaining Through an Expert Attorney, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 168, 169 
(1994); Janusz Ordover & Ariel Rubinstein, A Sequential Concession Game with Asymmetric 
Information, 101 Q.J. ECON. 879, 880 (1986); Stephen Salant, Litigation of Settlement Demands 
Questioned by Bayesian Defendants 1 (Cal. Inst. of Tech., Working Paper, 1984); see also Ben 
DePoorter, Law in the Shadow of Bargaining: The Precedent Effect of Settlement, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 
957, 987 (2010) (discussing informal networking among lawyers regarding the “going rates” of private 
settlements and their use in private negotiations); Howard et al., supra note 3, at 433 (discussing the 
role of fairness in settlements). 
 6. Vidmar et al., Uncovering, supra note 1, at 355; Vidmar et al., Million Dollar, supra note 2, at 
1345. This finding is also consistent with the disappearing-trial phenomenon, which has found that the 
rate of trials for civil cases is approaching zero. See Gillian K. Hadfield, Where Have All the Trials 
Gone? Settlements, Nontrial Adjudications, and Statistical Artifacts in the Changing Disposition of 
Federal Civil Cases, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 705, 705 (2004) (finding that the rate of settlement 
has declined, but that the rate of nontrial adjudication has increased, which is consistent with some of 
the pretrial mechanisms presented in this research); see also Herbert M. Kritzer, Disappearing Trials? 
A Comparative Perspective, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 735, 736, (2004); Allan Kanner & M. Ryan 
Casey, Daubert and the Disappearing Jury Trial, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 281, 299 (2006); Marc Galanter, A 
World Without Trials, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 7, 21 (2007); Shari Seidman Diamond & Jessica Bina, 
Puzzles About Supply-Side Explanations for Vanishing Trials: A New Look at Fundamentals, 1 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 637, 645–46 (2004). 
 7. NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY 28–29 (1995). 
 8. Id. 
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A study of North Carolina closed-claim files found that the information-
gathering process often resulted in changes in the insurers’ evaluations of the 
cases.9 For instance, an initial defense expert might say there was no negligence; 
but after consulting with other experts, the defense lawyer and liability insurer 
might decide negligence had occurred. Indeed, the variation among experts 
about the presence of negligence is one of the causes of litigation itself.10 
Deposing the plaintiff’s experts might change the insurer’s evaluation of the 
claim’s merit still again. Despite claims about “nuisance settlements,” insurers 
are reluctant to settle cases unless there is substantial evidence of legal 
negligence on the part of the insured.11 Similarly, the results of the discovery 
process often cause plaintiffs to abandon claims when they conclude that 
negligence cannot be proven or, in any event, that the costs of litigation would 
offset any potential recovery. 
In short, this article contributes to the topic of alternative dispute resolution 
(ADR) by drawing attention to the frequent and complicated evidentiary 
problems in medical malpractice claims and the procedural mechanisms 
provided by statutes, court rules, and case law that are already in place to 
facilitate claim resolution. Other states have procedural mechanisms similar to 
those in Florida. As such, while proposed ADR procedures might well provide 
better resolutions to medical malpractice claims, they must take into 
consideration both the unique characteristics of medical malpractice disputes 
and existing mechanisms for resolving these disputes. 
 
II 
REGULATION OF ADR IN FLORIDA 
In at least one sense, the nature of medical-malpractice claims makes them 
particularly suitable for ADR. The patient–provider relationship is not based 
on a traditional economic exchange.12 The deliberative nature of many ADR 
practices can benefit both the provider—who is able to avoid the pitfalls of 
engagement in a court battle—and the patient, who is seeking a resolution to a 
breach of confidence.13 Previous research on the general pretrial process in 
 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 23–35, 59–82; see also Neil Vidmar, Medical Malpractice Lawsuits: An Essay on Patient 
Interests, the Contingency Fee System, Juries, and Social Policy, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1217, 1219 (2005). 
 11. See Lance McMillian, The Nuisance Settlement “Problem”: The Elusive Truth and a Clarifying 
Proposal, 31 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 221, 228 (2007). 
 12. See Mark A. Hall & Carl E. Schneider, The Professional Ethics of Billing and Collections, 300 J. 
AM. MED. ASS’N 1806, 1806 (2008) (“In a relational model, medical service is embedded in a 
therapeutic relationship in which physicians have personal and moral ties to patients that make 
maximizing profits inappropriate.”); Allen K. Hutkin, Resolving the Medical Malpractice Crisis: 
Alternatives to Litigation, 4 J.L. & HEALTH 21, 26–29 (1989–1990) (discussing the unique aspects of the 
physician–patient relationship). 
 13. See John Cooley, A Dose of ADR for the Health Care Industry, DISP. RESOL. J., Feb.–Apr. 
2002, at 16, 20 (stating “[c]o-mediation has repeatedly produced win–win solutions”); Roderick B. 
Mathews, The Role of ADR in Managed Health Care Disputes, DISP. RESOL. J., Aug. 1999, at 8, 11 
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medical-malpractice cases, and Florida cases in particular, however, suggests a 
need for further investigation into the types of claims that are resolved, both 
outside the formal litigation system and during pretrial processes following a 
lawsuit. 
The research presented in this article leaves the discussions of efficiency, 
fairness, and legality to others. Instead, it focuses on building a profile of the 
types of cases that are resolved at each pretrial stage of the claiming process. 
Creating a quantitative profile of each step between incident and court 
demonstrates the effectiveness of a regulatory framework governing the course 
of claims before trial and the consequent opportunities for settlement. The 
profile also reveals the timeline for claim resolution, the payments involved at 
each stage, and the extent to which medical-malpractice claims and resolution 
change over time. Particular attention is paid to the resolution of large-payment 
cases. 
To start this discussion, it is important to understand that the course of a 
medical-malpractice claim is guided by statutory regulations. Figure 1 displays a 
timeline for a claim resulting in adjudication, from incident to appeal.14 
Figure 1: Timeline for a Medical-Malpractice Claim in Florida 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1999) (describing the advantages of ADR including privacy, confidentiality, and avoiding the win-or-
lose confrontation of the courtroom). 
 14. The timeline presented here is specific to the process in Florida. For a simplified timeline, see 
Thomas Metzloff, Alternative Dispute Resolution Strategies in Medical Malpractice, 9 ALASKA L. REV. 
429, 430 (1992). 
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Florida, like many other states,15 constrains the claiming process through a 
number of statutory guidelines. By statute, a plaintiff may not file a lawsuit for a 
period of ninety days after notifying the defendant of the medical malpractice 
claim.16 During this ninety-day period, the defendant must conduct a review of 
the incident in question.17 After this internal review, the defendant can reject 
the claim, make a settlement offer, or move that the claim be handled through 
arbitration.18 During the pre-suit period, both the plaintiff and defendant may 
engage in informal discovery; but any information obtained in this informal 
stage is inadmissible if a lawsuit is filed.19 All medical-malpractice claims must 
be bound to a mediation process within 120 days after a lawsuit is filed.20 In 
addition, claims can be submitted for arbitration for the sole determination of 
damages if the defendant concedes fault.21 These procedural rules, of course, are 
intended to promote discussion and foster a resolution of the claim. There are 
additional rules and practices that apply if the claim is not resolved through 
mediation, including settlement conferences with the judge who is assigned to 
 
 15. Many states have statutory requirements for the pretrial process for general grievances and 
medical-malpractice claims. See, e.g., Richard H. Steen, NEW JERSEY: Med-Mal Reform Addresses 
ADR, DISP. RESOL. J., Aug.–Oct. 2004, at 6, 6–7; Kelly Meadows, Note, Resolving Medical Malpractice 
Disputes in Massachusetts: Statutory and Judicial Initiatives in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 4 
SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 165, 172–75 (1999); Michael E. Weinzierl, Wisconsin’s New Court-
Ordered ADR Law: Why It Is Needed and Its Potential for Success, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 583, 591 (1995). 
Michigan requires mediation. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.4903 (2000). Minnesota has general 
requirements for ADR, not just aimed at medical malpractice. MINN. STAT. § 145.682 (2010). Montana 
medical-malpractice claims are subject to mandatory settlement conference conducted by a panel of 
senior judges. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-6-105, 27-6-701 (2009). New Jersey requires the use of an 
arbitrator if the amount of the claim is $20,000 or less. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23A-20 (West 2010). 
Other states, such as New York, New Mexico, Ohio, and Pennsylvania allow parties to engage in 
arbitration, but do not require it. 
 16. FLA. STAT. § 766.106(3)(a) (2010). 
 17. Florida requires that the review be conducted by either (1) a duly qualified claims adjuster; (2) 
a panel comprised of a malpractice attorney, a healthcare provider trained in the same or similar 
medical specialty as the prospective defendant, and a duly-qualified claims adjuster; (3) a medical-
review committee of a society of healthcare providers; or (4) any similar procedure that fairly and 
promptly evaluates the pending claim. Id. § 766.106(3)(a). In addition, Section 766.106(4) requires that 
insurers must investigate all claims with the cooperation of both parties. The investigation may include 
a screening panel. No civil liability will arise from participation in the pretrial screening “if done 
without intentional fraud.” 
 18. Id. § 766.106(4)(b). The Florida law adds to the growing practice in healthcare of requiring 
patients to sign binding arbitration agreements when they receive care. See, e.g., Ann Krasuski, 
Mandatory Arbitration Agreements Do Not Belong in Nursing Home Contracts with Residents, 8 
DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 263, 264 (2004); Kenneth A. DeVille, The Jury Is Out: Pre-dispute 
Binding Arbitration Agreements for Medical Malpractice Claims, 28 J. LEGAL MED. 333, 333 (2007); 
Sandra Benson, Pre-injury Agreements To Arbitrate Health Care Disputes: Legally “Shocking” or 
Legally Sensible, 11 J. LEGAL ETHICAL & REG. ISSUES 59, 59 (2008). Courts frequently address the 
legality of these agreements. See, e.g., Owens v. Nat’l Health Corp., 263 S.W.3d 867, 879 (Tenn. 2007); 
Briarcliff Nursing Home, Inc. v. Turcotte, 894 So.2d 661, 663 (Ala. 2004); Hogan v. Country Villa 
Health Servs., 55 Cal. Rptr. 3d 450, 453–55 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (citing Garrison v. Super. Ct. of L.A. 
Cnty., 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d 350 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005)). 
 19. FLA. STAT. § 766.106(5) (2010). 
 20. Id. § 766.108(1). 
 21. Id. § 766.106(3)(b)(3). 
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the case. All of these rules are intended to promote discussion and settlement 
without trial. Moreover, as described below, by statute, Florida physicians can 
opt to practice without liability insurance coverage; and a substantial number of 
physicians have chosen to do so. This factor too can affect the settlement 
process. With this preliminary overview of the legal guidelines and processes, 
research on the Florida closed-claim database is presented. 
III 
METHOD AND DATA 
The principal source of these data is the Florida Medical Malpractice Closed 
Claim Report obtained from the Florida Department of Financial Services.22 
Florida law requires professional-liability insurers and self-insurers to report 
detailed information relating to every medical-malpractice claim, regardless of 
whether it results in payment to the claimant.23 Each claim is coded for up to 
seventy-six variables,24 including when and where the incident occurred, the 
date the claim was filed, the seriousness of the most severe alleged injury, 
whether a lawsuit resulted, the date of the lawsuit, how and when the lawsuit 
was resolved, the amount of indemnity paid (if any), and the defense-litigation 
costs. The database also includes brief, prose summaries of the nature of the 
injury, which provide a basis for qualitative analyses to supplement the 
quantitative analyses. 
There are several important and unique characteristics of medical practice 
in Florida that bear upon interpretations of the database. As discussed, Florida 
is the only state that allows healthcare providers to practice without liability-
insurance coverage as long as they sign a nonrevocable letter of credit to cover 
medical-negligence injuries up to $250,000.25 In 2003, approximately 600 doctors 
chose this option.26 By 2008, reports indicate that as many as 5,200 doctors had 
 
 22. Doctor/Lawyer Malpractice Tracking System, FLA. OFFICE OF INS. REGULATION, http:// 
www.floir.com/Liability/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2011) [hereinafter Tracking System]. The Florida Closed 
Claims database contains brief summary accounts of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff, the actions 
of the defendant(s), the nature of the misdiagnosis (if one allegedly occurred), and the remedial actions 
undertaken by the defendant(s). After cleaning and organizing the data, the descriptions of injuries 
were run through a qualitative analysis program (Atlas.ti) to determine common patterns of injuries 
and actions. After groupings of the data were determined, the descriptions were read through by the 
authors and common problems, occurrences, and issues were identified. Although the full descriptions 
are available online from the state of Florida, human subjects protocol dictates that the authors provide 
the information from these claims in a manner that assures the confidentiality of both the plaintiff and 
the defendant. As the names of the parties could be extrapolated from the Florida database using 
newspaper reports or court documents, the full details of each claim are not provided. 
 23. FLA. STAT. § 627.912(1)(a), (5) (2010). 
 24. See id. § 627.912(1)(c) (detailing reporting requirements). 
 25. Id. § 627.912(1)(a), (5). 
 26. Vidmar et al., Uncovering, supra note 1, at 325. 
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chosen the no-liability-insurance option.27 Claims against these doctors must still 
be reported to the Florida Department of Insurance, but there is no systematic 
policing of compliance.28 
This has two implications. The obvious methodological implication is that 
some claims may not be reported in the files. The substantive implication is that 
the failure to carry liability insurance may discourage claims because plaintiffs’ 
lawyers may be discouraged from filing lawsuits on the grounds that a $250,000 
limit on their litigation costs will offset any recovery.29 
Although the dataset extends back to 1975, the analyses are limited to 
claims closed from the year 1990 forward through 2008.30 Caution must be used 
in interpreting the final three years of the dataset, because previous research 
has shown that, after a lawsuit is filed, the average time to closing the file is 3.39 
years, with an average standard deviation of 1.96 years.31 Consequently, 
although the 2006 through 2009 data capture information on claims closed 
during this period, many claims first filed between 2005 and 2008 would not yet 
have been resolved. The result is an incomplete profile of claims during the last 
years covered in this study. The later years are included in the analyses but 
should be treated with caution. 
IV 
A GENERAL PROFILE OF MEDICAL-MALPRACTICE CLOSED-CLAIMS IN 
FLORIDA 
A. The Total Number of Medical-Malpractice Claims 
The number of medical malpractice claims (as measured in incidents, claims, 
or dispositions) reveals important trends in filing and resolution. Table 1 
demonstrates that between 1990 and 1998, the population-adjusted number of 
incidents averaged 1,765 paid claims per year. Beginning in 1999, the numbers 
jumped substantially to an average of 2,635 paid claims per year. There was, on 
 
 27. Bob LaMendola, Uninsured Doctors on the Rise in South Florida, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, July 
27, 2008, available at http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2008-07-27/news/0807260139_1_malpractice-
insurance-medical-malpractice-doctors. 
 28. See William Monroe, Auditor General, Office of Ins. Regulation Closed Claim Database, 
Report No. 2005–31 Operational Audit 1 (2004) (noting inaccuracies in the database). The reported 
pain-and-suffering components of jury verdicts and settlements are especially prone to error. 
 29. The Florida statute requires all health professionals to report claims and thus the database 
includes claims against dentists, podiatrists, chiropractors, and independent nurses. FLA. STAT. § 
627.912(5) (2010). Because the concern about a medical-malpractice crisis was centered on physicians, 
those claims involving nonphysician professionals are eliminated from the analyses. 
 30. The analyses are limited to recent years to focus on the modern approach to the resolution of 
medical-malpractice claims. In addition, many of the regulatory requirements for pretrial actions in 
medical-malpractice claims were initiated in the 1980s. Analyses after this period allow for a clear 
understanding of the effects of pretrial-resolution methods. 
 31. The mean closing times and standard deviations are approximately the same from 1990 through 
2004. The mean disposition time between 2005 and 2008 increased to an average of 3.78 years. The 
authors offer no explanation at this time for this change. 
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average, a lag of 1.25 years between the occurrence of a negative outcome and 
the reporting of a claim, a lag of 2.05 years until the filing of a lawsuit, and a lag 
of 3.26 years until the disposition of the claim. Thus, beginning in about 2001, 
the number of lawsuits increased between 1990 and 2009. Finally, beginning in 
about 2004, the number of paid claims began to rise. 
Table 1: Paid Claims by Incident, Suit, and Disposition Date 
Year 
Florida 
Population Incidents Suits Dispositions 
Incidents 
(per 
100,000) 
Suits  
(per 
100,000) 
Dispositions 
(per 100,000) 
1990 13,033,307 1,349 855 1,342 10.35 6.56 10.30 
1991 13,369,798 1,549 892 1,319 11.59 6.67 9.87 
1992 13,650,553 1,568 1,108 1,172 11.49 8.12 8.59 
1993 13,927,185 1,623 1,106 1,231 11.65 7.94 8.84 
1994 14,239,444 1,681 1,243 1,390 11.81 8.73 9.76 
1995 14,537,875 1,771 1,278 1,725 12.18 8.79 11.87 
1996 14,853,360 1,721 1,333 1,988 11.59 8.97 13.38 
1997 15,186,304 1,716 1,195 1,787 11.30 7.87 11.77 
1998 15,486,559 1,786 1,244 1,676 11.53 8.03 10.82 
1999 15,759,421 2,194 1,177 1,378 13.92 7.47 8.74 
2000 16,049,316 2,641 1,320 1,481 16.46 8.22 9.23 
2001 16,348,628 2,706 1,817 1,520 16.55 11.11 9.30 
2002 16,667,906 2,428 2,194 1,627 14.57 13.16 9.76 
2003 16,959,251 1,949 2,171 2,087 11.49 12.80 12.31 
2004 17,342,623 1,524 1,838 2,954 8.79 10.60 17.03 
2005 17,736,027 1,125 1,182 2,646 6.34 6.66 14.92 
2006 18,057,508 836 1,108 2,346 4.63 6.14 12.99 
2007 18,251,243 473 802 2,068 2.59 4.39 11.33 
2008 18,328,340 215 453 1,990 1.17 2.47 10.86 
2009 18,537,969 25 146 1,659 0.13 0.79 8.95 
 
The shaded cells in Table 1 indicate data on the number of occurrences and 
suits that must be treated cautiously because some claims from those years 
might still be working their way through the system. 
Although columns three through five of Table 1 report raw numbers, they 
do not reflect changes in Florida’s population. In 1990, the population was 
13,033,307; it grew steadily to 18,328,340 in 2008, an increase of 28.9%, or an 
average population increase of 1.5% each year.32 The growth in population, 
especially with a trend toward an older population,33 increases the chances of 
 
 32. Population data from American Community Survey, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http:// 
factfinder.census.gov/servlet/DatasetMainPageServlet?_program=ACS&_submenuId=datasets_1&_lan
g=en&_ts= (last visited Jan. 11, 2011). 
 33. The median age in Florida is 40.2 years, which is almost four years older than the median 
population in the United States (36.8 years). Population data from ACS Demographic and Housing 
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serious illnesses and negative outcomes during medical treatment. To account 
for the possible increase in patients and medical care, Table 1 also reports the 
dates of the alleged malpractice occurrence, the year a lawsuit was filed, and the 
paid claims for each year adjusted for population.34 
Figure 2 presents the above data in graphic form, although it stops at 2006 
because claims made after 2004 or 2005 are not expected to be resolved yet due 
to the lag time between occurrence and resolution. The lag in time between 
occurrence and suit and between occurrence and disposition can be seen in the 
peak years of each of these elements in the graph. 
Figure 2: Paid Claims Adjusted for Population Growth 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B. The Amount of Indemnity Paid 
An item of consistent interest in medical-malpractice claims is the amount 
paid to the plaintiff for medical, wage, legal, and other expenses. Table 2 gives 
the breakdown of average and standard deviation amounts paid in each of these 
categories.35 
 
 
 
Estimates: 2008, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/MYPTable?_bm=y&-
geo_id=04000US12&-qr_name=ACS_2008_1YR_G00_CP5_1&-ds_name=ACS_2008_1YR_G00_&-
_lang=en&-redoLog=false (last visited Mar. 12, 2011). 
 34. Controlling for the population increase reveals patterns remarkably similar to the raw data. 
Because the patterns are similar and the raw data are much easier to interpret, the remainder of this 
paper will use the raw data. 
 35. All dollar amounts are adjusted to 2008 dollars to account for inflation. 
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Table 2: Amounts Paid to Plaintiffs in Medical-Malpractice Claims 
 
Number 
of 
Claims 
Average 
(USD) 
Standard 
Deviation 
(USD) 
Amount Paid to Plaintiff by Primary Insurer 66,246 129,620 559,007 
Medical Costs (Past and Future) 66,334 58,061 1,022,354 
Wage Costs (Past and Future) 66,334 19,864 263,084 
Other Costs (Past and Future) 66,334 22,161 2,103,564 
Noneconomic Losses* 66,334 72,619 1,174,270 
Loss-Adjustment Expense Paid to Defense Counsel 32,056 42,245 1,043,080 
All Other Loss-Adjustment Expenses Paid 32,056 12,170 95,018 
Amount Paid to Plaintiff by Primary Insurer (ONLY 
PAID CLAIMS) 
20,685 302,476 907,041 
 
As Table 2 shows, the average indemnity paid to the plaintiff is not an 
extremely large amount, but is not dismissible either. The figure for 
“noneconomic” losses has an asterisk because previous investigation of the 
Florida closed-claim files has shown these figures to be unreliable and often 
inflated by the liability insurer to downplay the plaintiff’s actual economic 
losses.36 Examining only the paid claims, the average payment increased 
dramatically to just over $300,000. Another element of interest is that 68.8% of 
all claims were resolved without any payment.37 
 
V 
THE SEVERITY OF THE ALLEGED INJURY 
The Florida law requires the insurer to rate the severity of the alleged injury 
on the widely used nine-point scale originally developed by the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC).38 Table 3 reports, for each 
year, the mean percentage of paid claims according to each severity level.39 
 
 36. See Vidmar et al., Uncovering, supra note 1, at 325–28 (discussing the limitations of the closed-
claim files). 
 37. The number of claims paid is 20,685, which is 31.2% of 66,334. Therefore, 31.2% of claims were 
paid. The group of claims resolved without payment should be distinguished from those claims that are 
abandoned. Claims in the first group are resolved, but there is no payment. 
 38. NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, INTRODUCTION: CLAIM REPORT FORM, 2 MALPRACTICE 
CLAIMS: FINAL COMPILATION 2, 8 (M. Sowka ed., 1980). The scale is as follows: 
Level Type of Injury Examples of Injury 
1 Emotional Only Fright, no physical damage 
2 Temporary: Slight Lacerations; contusions, minor scars, rash. No delay 
3 Temporary: Minor Infections, mis-set fracture, fall in hospital. Recovery delayed 
4 Temporary: Major Burns, surgical material left, drug side-effect, brain damage. 
Recovery delayed 
5 Permanent: Minor Loss of fingers, loss or damage to organs. Includes non-
disabling injuries 
6 Permanent: Significant Deafness, loss of limb, loss of eye, loss of one kidney or lung 
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Table 3: Severity Level of Medical-Malpractice Claims 
Severity 
Level Claims 
Percent of  
Total Claims Paid Claims 
Percent of Claims 
that Are Paid 
1 3,178 5% 1,446 46% 
2 3,614 6% 1,895 52% 
3 10,654 17% 6,630 62% 
4 6,192 10% 4,094 66% 
5 8,353 14% 6,198 74% 
6 6,571 11% 4,820 73% 
7 3,443 6% 2,729 79% 
8 2,558 4% 2,039 80% 
9 16,932 28% 12,419 73% 
 
As Table 3 shows, the number of claims in each severity level varied 
significantly, with the most common severity level being 9—which indicates the 
patient died. In addition, those claims that ultimately ended in a payment to the 
plaintiff also varied by severity level, ranging from 46% for level 1 claims to 
80% for level 8 claims, with the more-severe injuries having higher payment 
rates. As there are large variations between severity levels displayed in Table 3, 
the examination of severity is continued in subsequent sections. 
VI 
STAGES OF RESOLUTION 
Table 4 displays the stage of resolution for resolved claims. The majority of 
claims are either dropped or abandoned (19%), resolved before a suit is filed 
(16%), or resolved after the suit is filed but before trial (50%). 
 
7 Permanent: Major Paraplegia, blindness, loss of two limbs, brain damage 
8 Permanent: Grave Quadriplegia, severe brain damage, lifelong care or fatal 
prognosis 
9 Permanent Death 
The closed-claims database also includes a prose description of the injury. 
 39. A similar analysis was presented in Vidmar et al., Uncovering, supra note 1, at 349, but the data 
presented in Table 3 are not precisely comparable because this article focuses only on physicians and 
hospitals, eliminating all other healthcare providers. 
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Table 4: Stages of Resolution 
Stage Number Percentage 
Claim or Suit Abandoned 6,170 19% 
During Arbitration 1,363 4% 
Before Pre-suit Period 644 2% 
Within 90 Days of Suit Being Filed 947 3% 
Pre-suit Period 5,057 16% 
Before or During Mandatory Settlement Conference 16,305 50% 
During Trial but Before Verdict 379 1% 
After Verdict but Before Filing of Appeal 664 2% 
After Notice of Appeal is Filed or Posted 664 2% 
During Appeal 80 0% 
After Appeal 194 1% 
 
In other words, the vast majority of paid claims (94%) were resolved before 
or during trial—that is, before a formal judgment by the court. Thus, much of 
the remainder of this discussion will focus on how specific details of claims 
affect the stage of resolution, broken down by claims resolved (1) through 
arbitration, (2) before a suit, (3) during the pre-suit period, (4) after the suit is 
filed but before trial, and (5) after a trial begins but before a verdict is rendered. 
These claims are also compared to those resolved after a verdict. 
VII 
SUBPROFILES OF THE STAGES OF RESOLUTION 
A. Claims Resolved Before the Pre-suit Period 
As described earlier, a plaintiff may not file a suit for a period of ninety days 
after notifying the defendant of the claim of medical malpractice.40 The data 
show, however, that some claims are settled before the plaintiff officially 
notifies the defendant of the claim. The claims resolved prior to the official 
notification are resolved before the plaintiff officially contacts the defendant for 
information regarding the claim. Although the number of these claims was not 
substantial in terms of the overall percentage, as evidenced in Table 4, the 
number has grown in recent years.41 
 
 
 
 
 40. FLA. STAT. § 766.106(3)(a) (2010). 
 41. Please note, again, that the most recent years’ data is unpredictable at best and should be 
treated with caution. 
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Figure 3: Claims Resolved Before the Pre-suit Period 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 shows that a small portion of claims (644 overall) were resolved 
before the notification of a claim. Recall that the overall time from incident to 
disposition for all claims averaged 3.25 years. In contrast, claims resolved before 
the pre-suit period required an average of 1.5 years for disposition. In addition, 
these claims were reported much more quickly. Although it took most claims 
470 days (or 1.28 years) from incident to reporting, claims resolved before the 
pre-suit period were reported in 208 days (or just over half a year). Claims 
resolved before the pre-suit period had a lower average payment ($90,867) than 
the overall average of $129,620. Resolving a claim at this stage, however, 
resulted in a much-higher likelihood of payment to the plaintiff; ninety-four 
percent of these claims resulted in a payment. As such, the average payout for 
paid claims settled before the pre-suit period was also lower ($96,894) than the 
overall average for paid claims ($302,476). The data presented in Figure 3 
combined with the data on average payments suggest, but do not prove, that 
those claims resolved before the official notification appear to have involved 
clear-cut issues of negligence, but did not involve gross negligence. Descriptions 
of incidents42 included general-liability issues, such as patients falling in the 
hospital or equipment failures; issues with hospital management, such as long 
wait times; and billing issues, such as a hospital charging for resuscitation when 
patient had a current DNR order.43 
One of the principle areas of concern with medical care is rates of 
misdiagnoses. Approximately twenty percent of claims involved some allegation 
 
 42. Descriptions of claims and allegations have been redacted to remove identifying information 
and to protect the identities of the patients and providers. 
 43. Tracking System, supra note 22. 
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of an issue with a diagnosis.44 Claims involving a misdiagnosis were less likely to 
result in payment,45 but the average size of the payment for claims with an 
allegation of misdiagnosis was higher than the average payment for claims 
without an allegation of misdiagnosis.46 
Table 5 shows that claims resolved before the official notification of a claim 
were clustered, in terms of severity, with the largest number (by far) grouped in 
severity levels 2 through 4, and with an additional group of resolutions involving 
severity level 9—that is, medical incidents that led to death of the patient. 
Table 5: Severity Level of Claims Resolved Before the Pre-suit Period 
Severity 
Level 
Resolved Claims Before 
Pre-Suit Period 
Total Resolved 
Claims 
Percent of Total Resolved 
Claims 
1 39 3,178 1% 
2 75 3,614 2% 
3 267 10,654 3% 
4 94 6,192 2% 
5 48 8,353 1% 
6 18 6,571 0% 
7 18 3,443 1% 
8 7 2,558 0% 
9 78 16,932 0% 
 
The significant increase in the number of cases resolved before the official 
notification of a malpractice claim is interesting; but at present, there is no clear 
explanation for the finding. Insurers and medical providers may simply be 
settling smaller claims as soon as the incident occurs. Perhaps the internal 
reporting mechanisms in hospitals and other medical providers have triggers 
allowing for the quick payment of malpractice claims when fault is clear but the 
severity and consequent settlement amount is small. Early settlement avoids 
legal transaction costs for the liability insurer, possibly requiring minimal 
involvement of lawyers. Alternatively, it may be that the movement towards 
apologies for healthcare errors is finding root in Florida, allowing for earlier 
settlements. Finally, in 2004, Florida enacted legislation summarized as a “three 
strikes” law—healthcare providers who are found negligent or admit negligence 
three times lose their professional licenses. Perhaps this is motivating healthcare 
 
 44. The Florida closed-claims database includes a “misdiagnosis” category, which provides a 
verbatim account of the alleged misdiagnosis. Id. These data were transformed into binary variables, 
where “1” represented any allegation of misdiagnosis and “0” was an absence of misdiagnosis. All data 
were hand-coded by the authors. 
 45. The rate of payment for claims without an allegation of misdiagnosis was 95.5%, compared to 
87.2% for claims alleging misdiagnosis, a difference that is statistically significant to the 0.001 level. 
 46. The average payment for claims without an allegation of misdiagnosis was $90,114, compared 
to $93,752 for claims alleging misdiagnosis, a difference that is not statistically significant. 
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providers to settle smaller claims before the initiation of a lawsuit, to avoid 
getting a “strike.”47 
B. Resolutions Occurring During the Official Pre-suit Period 
The next profile is of claims resolved during the official ninety-day pre-suit 
period. Recall that in Florida, after filing a claim, plaintiffs must wait ninety 
days before filing a lawsuit.48 During this time, the defendant must conduct a 
review of the incident in question.49 After this internal review, the defendant can 
reject the claim, make a settlement offer, or move that the claim be handled 
through arbitration.50 In addition, during this period, both the plaintiff and 
defendant may engage in informal discovery, with the important qualification 
that any information gained is not admissible in a formal lawsuit if the claim 
does go forward.51 In recent years, the number of claims resolved during the pre-
suit period increased, peaking in 2002 for resolutions and 2004 for dispositions 
(see Figure 4 below). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 47. The proposed constitutional amendment was passed by voters in 2004, and is now in the 
Florida Constitution. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 26. The measure, however, was understandably 
controversial and resulted in some legislative retooling that rendered it less effective in practice. See 
Laura J. Spencer, The Florida “Three Strikes Rule” for Medical Malpractice Claims: Using a Clear and 
Convincing Evidence Standard To Tighten the Strike Zone for Physician Licensure Revocation, 28 ST. 
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 317, 320 (2008) (describing the scheme established by the amendment as 
“controversial”); Mary Coombs, How Not To Do Medical Malpractice Reform: A Florida Case Study, 
18 HEALTH MATRIX 373, 393–94 nn.88–90 (2008) (discussing the “three strikes” law amendment); 
Carol Gentry, Court Asked to Revive “3 Strikes,” HEALTH NEWS FLA., Sept. 10, 2010, available at 
http://www.healthnewsflorida.org/index.cfm/go/public.articleView/article/13838 (discussing criticisms of 
the enacted amendment); Melissa Morgan Hawkins, Amendments 7 and 8 Update: Legislation Enabling 
the Patients’ Right to Know Act and Three Strikes Rule, 24 TRIAL ADVOC. Q. 7, 9 (2006) (discussing the 
effect of the subsequent legislative enactments enabling the amendment). 
 48. FLA. STAT. § 766.106(3)(a) (2010). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. § 766.106(3)(b). 
 51. Id. § 766.106(5). 
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Figure 4: Claims Resolved in the Official Pre-suit Period 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Overall, claims resolved in the pre-suit period were reported in just under a 
year (342 days) and disposed of in 1.87 years (684 days), which is shorter than 
the overall average, but obviously longer than those cases settled before the 
pre-suit period. The average indemnity paid during the official pre-suit period 
was $194,227, which is higher than the payments in claims settled before formal 
notification ($90,867) and the overall average indemnity paid ($129,620). Just 
over eighty percent of claims resolved in the pre-suit period resulted in a 
payment to the plaintiff. If only the paid claims are considered, the average 
indemnity payment rose to $252,085, a figure that is under the overall average 
of $302,495 for all paid claims. 
There are quite a few similarities to the overall patterns of severity levels for 
claims resolved before the pre-suit period. In particular, the majority of pre-suit 
settlements were in the lower ranges of severity (levels 1 through 4), suggesting 
the defendant or the defendant’s insurer may have recognized that resolving the 
claim would result in smaller payments and litigation expenses than defending 
the claim. 
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Table 6: Severity Level of Claims Resolved in the Official Pre-suit Period 
Severity 
Level 
Resolved Claims During 
Pre-Suit Period 
Total Resolved 
Claims 
Percent of Total 
Resolved Claims 
1 306 3,178 10% 
2 565 3,614 16% 
3 1,368 10,654 13% 
4 780 6,192 13% 
5 760 8,353 9% 
6 465 6,571 7% 
7 268 3,443 8% 
8 214 2,558 8% 
9 1,329 16,932 8% 
 
Claims resolved during this period often involved allegations of failures to 
maintain the standard of care during the provision of medical treatment, 
including misdiagnoses; issues during surgery; the improper administration of 
drugs or anesthesia; and issues involving infants, birthing, and delivery.52 The 
overall rate of allegations of misdiagnoses remained in the low twenties (at 
22.4%), as with those claims resolved before the pre-suit period. The rate of 
payment was lower for claims involving an allegation of a misdiagnosis,53 but 
had no effect on the payment amounts.54 The data presented on claims resolved 
during the official pre-suit period suggest that, for many claims, the regulatory 
requirement of an investigation by the defendant’s insurer produced the desired 
effect: the resolution of claims outside the formal litigation system. Compared 
to those claims resolved before this period, these claims had a higher severity 
level overall and resulted in higher payments. These claims also appear to have 
been more complex, particularly in the determination of a failure to maintain 
the standard of care or to assess blame, than claims resolved before this period. 
C.  Claims Resolved Through Arbitration 
An examination of the claims resolved through arbitration revealed several 
interesting patterns. As discussed, all Florida medical-malpractice claims are 
bound to a mediation process unless they are resolved before a lawsuit.55 In 
addition, before, during, or after mediation the claim can be submitted for 
arbitration solely for the determination of damages, with the defendant 
 
 52. Tracking System, supra note 22. 
 53. The rate of payment for claims without an allegation of misdiagnosis was 84.2%, compared to 
68.9% for claims alleging misdiagnosis, a difference that is statistically significant to the 0.0001 level 
using a standard difference-of-means test. 
 54. The average payment for claims without an allegation of misdiagnosis was $193,890, compared 
to $238,117 for claims alleging misdiagnosis, a difference that is not statistically significant using a 
standard difference-of-means test. 
 55. FLA. STAT. § 766.108(1) (2010). 
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admitting fault.56 Figure 5 graphically displays the number of claims resolved 
through arbitration by occurrence and disposition year, as well as the total 
number of claims. As the figure shows, claims resolved through arbitration 
peaked in 1996 and again in 2004. The earlier peak does not mirror a general 
increase in the overall number of claims (see Figure 1).57 
Figure 5: Claims Resolved Through Arbitration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Examining the time to reporting and disposition for arbitration claims, 
however, reveals that claims resolved through arbitration were resolved in a 
much shorter time than would be expected.58 Recall that for claims overall, it 
took 3.25 years from occurrence to disposition. In contrast, claims resolved 
through arbitration only required 717 days, or 1.96 years, for final disposition.59 
The next set of data involves the average payments for claims resolved 
through arbitration. Recall that the average indemnity paid for all medical-
malpractice claims from 1990 to 2008 (in 2008 dollars) was $129,620. In contrast, 
claims resolved through arbitration had an average payment of $219,673, or 
approximately $80,000 more than the average payment overall. In addition, 
although 64% of all the claims resulted in payment, over 86% of claims 
resolved through arbitration resulted in payment, which produced higher 
 
 56. Id. § 766.106(3)(b)(3). 
 57. See supra Part IV.A (discussing an increase in claims corresponding with an increase in the 
Florida population). 
 58. Keep in mind that the later years of data (from approximately 2006 onward) should be treated 
with caution due to the likelihood that many claims had not yet been reported or closed at the time of 
data collection. 
 59. The time from occurrence to disposition took an average 717 days, with a minimum of sixteen 
days and a maximum of 4,102 days. From occurrence to reporting, the average claim resolved through 
arbitration takes just under one year (333 days), with a minimum of zero days and a maximum of 3,591 
days. 
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overall indemnity payments. In comparison to the average of $302,476 for all 
claims, the average payment for resolution through arbitration was $249,901. 
This finding is not very surprising given the higher number of low-severity 
claims resolved through arbitration and the process by which claims were 
submitted for arbitration, as claims may be submitted to arbitration for the 
determination of damages if the defendant has admitted fault. 
As Table 7 reports, there was a great deal of variation in the severity of 
claims resolved through arbitration. The most frequent severity levels were 
level 360 and level 9.61 
Table 7: Severity Levels of Claims Resolved Through Arbitration 
Severity 
Level 
Resolved Claims Through 
Arbitration 
Total Resolved 
Claims62 
Percent of Total 
Resolved Claims 
1 92 3,178 3% 
2 66 3,614 2% 
3 422 10,654 4% 
4 291 6,192 5% 
5 179 8,353 2% 
6 88 6,571 1% 
7 71 3,443 2% 
8 65 2,558 3% 
9 400 16,932 2% 
 
Examining the distribution of the severity levels of claims resolved through 
arbitration in the context of the overall number of claims reveals a slightly 
different picture. Column four of Table 7 presents the percentage of each 
severity level resolved through arbitration. Arbitration resolved more cases on 
the lower end of the severity scale, representing four percent of level 3 resolved 
cases and five percent of level 4 resolved cases. 
Claims resolved through arbitration often involved issues of monitoring and 
diagnosis in the alleged suffering of the patient and in the seriousness of 
allegations against the medical providers.63 The 20% of claims resolved through 
arbitration involving an allegation of misdiagnosis had a lower rate of payment 
(88.4% for claims without misdiagnosis, compared to 77.3% for claims with an 
allegation of misdiagnosis), but a higher average payment.64 As indicated in 
 
 60. Temporary: Minor—Infections, mis-set fracture, fall in hospital. Recovery delayed. See supra 
note 38 (providing the NAIC scale). 
 61. Permanent—Death. See id. 
 62. Here, both paid and unpaid claims are used, concentrating on those cases that have been 
resolved. 
 63. Tracking System, supra note 22. 
 64. The average payment for claims without an allegation of misdiagnosis was $191,802, compared 
to $315,208 for claims alleging misdiagnosis, a difference that is statistically significant to the 0.01 level 
using a standard difference-of-means test. 
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Table 7, there was also an increase in the seriousness of the injuries to the 
patients. In addition, the reports by the insurers and doctors revealed conflicts 
over liability, damages, and the appropriate course of action. For example, one 
claim involved an infant who went into septic shock after birth requiring below-
the-knee and partial upper-extremity amputations. This claim also involved a 
conflict between the doctors and defense counsel, who both believed the case 
defensible, and the liability insurer, who paid a pre-suit settlement to “protect 
the insured from any potential excess verdict.”65 
Claims resolved through arbitration were often incredibly complex and 
frequently involved the patient losing trust in the medical provider. It may be 
that arbitration can resolve these claims because the parties have to engage in a 
structured discussion and negotiation. 
D. Settlements Made Before or During the Mandatory Settlement Conference 
Next, consider claims settled before or during the mandatory settlement 
conference.66 By this point in the claiming process, the plaintiff and defendant 
have gone through a mandatory waiting period and the plaintiff has formally 
filed a suit for medical malpractice. The defendant has gone through an internal 
review, had an opportunity (during the pre-suit period) to make an offer of 
settlement or arbitration to the plaintiff, both sides have engaged in formal 
discovery, and the opportunity for the defendant to offer arbitration has 
remained available. Claims that reach this point were harder to resolve; thus, 
the payment rate declined but the size of payments increased compared to 
earlier stages in the resolution process. As displayed in Figure 6, the number of 
settled claims peaked in 2000 and 2001 for incidents, and 2004 and 2005 for 
dispositions, and then declined. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 65. As with all claims described in the paper, this claim is redacted to protect the identities of both 
the patient and providers. 
 66. See FLA. STAT. § 766.108(2)(a)–(b) (2010) (requiring all parties in medical malpractice claims 
to attend “a settlement conference at least 3 weeks before the date set for trial”). Generally, 
“[a]ttorneys who will conduct the trial, parties, and persons with authority to settle shall attend the 
settlement conference held before the court unless excused by the court for good cause.” Id. 
HOLMAN, VIDMAR, & LEE 4/3/2011   
Summer 2011] MOST CLAIMS SETTLE 123 
Figure 6: Claims Resolved Before or During the Mandatory Settlement 
Conference 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The downward slope in incidents of settled claims could be explained by the 
dramatically longer time from incident to disposition for claims in this stage as 
compared to claims resolved before the pre-suit period, during the pre-suit 
period, or during arbitration. The time from incident to disposition for claims 
settled during the mandatory settlement conference averaged 1,473 days (over 4 
years).67 As such, the incident data in the later years presented above may 
represent a dramatic underestimation of the number of settled cases. The 
average payment pattern for settled cases ($251,094) was higher than the overall 
average, as well as in comparison to claims resolved before or in the pre-suit 
period or through arbitration. The 81.5% of settled claims that were paid had 
an average indemnity of $309,762, which was again higher than the overall 
average ($302,495), and the average payment for paid cases resolved at earlier 
stages. 
An additional difference—beyond the time between the incident and the 
disposition—between cases settled at this stage and those resolved earlier was 
the severity of the cases. As Table 8 below shows, there were much-larger 
numbers of higher-severity cases settled and a much-lower distribution of cases 
in severity levels 1 through 4. 
 
 67. This metric was not introduced in profiling other stages of resolution as there were no suits 
filed in many of the cases resolved prior to the mandatory settlement conference. Thus, such a figure 
would be meaningless. At this stage of resolution, however, there is a requirement of a suit for a 
mandatory settlement conference, so the amount of time from occurrence to suit is meaningful. 
HOLMAN, VIDMAR, & LEE 4/3/2011 
124 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 74:103 
Table 8: Severity Level of Claims Resolved Before or During the 
Mandatory Settlement Conference 
Severity 
Level 
Resolved Claims Before 
or During the Mandatory 
Settlement Conference 
Total Resolved 
Claims 
Percent of Total 
Resolved Claims 
1 505 3,178 16% 
2 478 3,614 13% 
3 2,558 10,654 24% 
4 1,652 6,192 27% 
5 3,247 8,353 39% 
6 2,418 6,571 37% 
7 1,447 3,443 42% 
8 1,011 2,558 40% 
9 6,850 16,932 40% 
 
The prose summaries of claims reveal a high number of level 9 claims 
involving death. Examining claims resolved before or during the mandatory 
settlement conference, there was an increase in claims involving allegations of 
misdiagnoses, with a third of claims (thirty-three percent) involving issues of 
misdiagnoses. The claims involving misdiagnoses continued to result in lower 
payment rates,68 but misdiagnoses had no effect on the size of the average 
payment.69 
E. Resolutions During the Trial, After the Verdict, or After Appeal 
The final set of analyses involves those cases that settled after the trial 
begins, during the trial, after the verdict, during the appeal, or after the appeal. 
Parties settle claims at this stage to avoid a trial judgment, avoid an appeal, or 
avoid the ramifications of a verdict at either the trial or appellate level. A very 
low number of claims were settled at this stage. As Figure 7 shows, the number 
of claims settled after the trial began peaked in 2000 and 2001. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 68. The rate of payment for claims without an allegation of misdiagnosis was 82.3%, compared to 
79.3% for claims alleging misdiagnosis, a difference that is statistically significant to the 0.001 level 
using a standard difference-of-means test. 
 69. The average payment for claims without an allegation of misdiagnosis was $250,591, compared 
to $257,366 for claims alleging misdiagnosis, a difference that is not statistically significant. 
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Figure 7. Claims Resolved During the Trial, After the Verdict, or During 
Appeal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As with claims settled during the mandatory settlement conference, these 
claims had a much-longer lifespan from incident to disposition, namely an 
average of five years (1,866 days). Generally, the long time-lag between 
disposition and resolution is a result of delays between reporting and 
disposition. Overall, these claims had a much-higher indemnity payment, paying 
$361,364 on average, or a full $230,000 above the average overall payment. 
These claims, however, were also much less likely to result in payment; only 
forty-four percent resulted in payment. As a result, the average indemnity paid 
for these claims was quite high at $883,420—a full $500,000 above the average 
overall payment for all paid claims. 
Similar to the claims settled before or during the mandatory settlement 
conference (see Table 8 above), the claims settled after the beginning of the 
trial were more likely to occupy the higher ranges of severity. Taking this 
pattern into account, the distribution of these claims was fairly even among 
severity levels, as demonstrated by Table 9 below. 
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Table 9: Severity Level of Claims Resolved During the Trial, After the 
Verdict, or During Appeal 
Severity 
Level 
Resolved Claims During the 
Trial, After the Verdict, or 
During Appeal 
Total Resolved 
Claims 
Percent of Total 
Resolved Claims 
1 31 3,178 1% 
2 48 3,614 1% 
3 190 10,654 2% 
4 146 6,192 2% 
5 298 8,353 4% 
6 250 6,571 4% 
7 147 3,443 4% 
8 79 2,558 3% 
9 600 16,932 4% 
 
The small number of claims resolved during the trial process were more 
likely to involve an allegation of misdiagnosis—thirty-eight percent of these 
claims involved some type of misdiagnosis allegation. The misdiagnosis 
allegation, however, had no effect on the rate of payment70 and it did not change 
the average payment.71 Claims resolved during the trial involved a high number 
of issues surrounding births and infant health, as well as an increase in the 
severity of injuries resulting from strict-liability conduct or misdiagnoses.72 
VIII 
PREDICTING THE PRESENCE AND AMOUNT OF PAYMENT 
The data suggest that the stage of resolution increased the probability of a 
payment from the defendant to the plaintiff. Applying a logistical-regression 
model to these data can demonstrate the effect of each stage on the probability 
of payment, using claims resolved during the settlement period as the baseline.73 
The logistic model in Table 10 reveals several interesting results. First, resolving 
a claim before the pre-suit period showed the largest positively substantive 
effect on the probability that a claim would result in payment, whereas 
resolution during or after a trial had a negative effect. Arbitration and 
resolution during the pre-suit period had near equal effects on the probability 
of payment. 
 
 70. The rate of payment for claims without an allegation of misdiagnosis was 44.6%, compared to 
42.1% for claims alleging misdiagnosis, a difference that is statistically significant to the 0.001 level. 
 71. The average payment for claims without an allegation of misdiagnosis was $356,790, compared 
to $435,479 for claims alleging misdiagnosis, a difference that is not statistically significant. 
 72. Tracking System, supra note 22. 
 73. The settlement period is used as the baseline because it is the period when the most claims are 
resolved. Using it as the baseline allows for a comparison to the most likely scenario. 
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Table 10: Effect of Stage of Resolution on Probability of Payment 
 
Variable Odds Ratio74 
(Standard Error)75  
Before Pre-suit Period 2.696** 
 (0.165) 
  
Pre-suit Period 1.268** 
 (0.0405) 
  
Arbitration 1.661** 
 (0.0810) 
  
During or After Trial -0.867** 
 (0.0575) 
  
Misdiagnosis 0.0334 
 (0.0279) 
  
Severity 0.104** 
 (0.00479) 
  
Number of Days Between Incident and Disposition 0.000227** 
 (0.0000186) 
  
Constant -0.504** 
 (0.0372) 
N 32,056 
Pseudo R² 76 0.584 
 + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
     
Looking at a variety of control variables, Table 10 supports a finding that 
the presence of a misdiagnosis allegation slightly increased the probability of 
payment. The higher the claim’s severity, the higher the likelihood of payment; 
whereas the longer the claim took to be resolved, the lower the likelihood of 
payment. None of these control variables, however, came close to having a 
similarly substantive effect on the likelihood of payment as resolution before 
 
 74. The odds ratio column gives the amount of change expected in the odds ratio when there is a 
one unit change in the predictor variable, with all of the other variables in the model held constant. An 
odds ratio close to 1.0 suggests that there is no change due to the predictor variable. 
 75. The standard error for the odds ratio is obtained from the logistic regression coefficient and its 
standard error using the formula: se(odds ratio) = exp(coef.)*se(coef.). 
 76. Using dichotomous data (such as data presented here, in terms of the probability of payment) 
necessitates the use of logistic regression, where an equivalent statistic to R-squared does not exist. As 
such, an equivalent figure is calculated using McFadden’s R-squared. See JEREMY FREESE & J. SCOTT 
LONG, REGRESSION MODELS FOR CATEGORICAL DEPENDENT VARIABLES USING STATA 109 (2d ed. 
2006) (discussing McFadden’s R-squared). 
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the pre-suit period, during the pre-suit period, or through arbitration. The 
stage-of-resolution, presence-of-misdiagnosis, severity-of-injury, and time-to-
resolution variables explained more than half of the variance in whether a claim 
resulted in a payment.77 
Examining the same set of variables on the amount of payment revealed 
equally interesting patterns. 
Table 11: Effect of Stage of Resolution on Payment Amount for Paid Claims 
 
Variable Coefficient78 
(Standard Error)79 
Before Pre-suit Period -14,780.5 
 (29,910.2) 
  
Pre-suit Period 55,144.9** 
 (12,140.0) 
  
Arbitration 66,618.8** 
 (20,981.5) 
  
During or After Trial 177,032.8** 
 (20,650.9) 
  
Misdiagnosis 14,965.1 
 (9,450.8) 
  
Severity 37,725.5** 
 (1,617.0) 
  
Number of Days Between Incident and Disposition 7.541 
 (6.264) 
  
Constant -53,700.8** 
 (12,810.0) 
N 31,968 
R² 0.021 
 + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
  
The results presented in Table 11 demonstrate that there was no difference 
in the amount of payment for resolved claims before the pre-suit stage 
compared to resolution through a settlement conference (which is the most 
 
 77. The pseudo R², which measures the goodness of the model’s fit, was just over 0.58 for these 
variables. 
 78. The coefficient is the value for the regression equation for predicting the effect of the 
dependent variable from the independent variable. 
 79. The standard error is used for testing whether the parameter is significantly different from 0 by 
dividing the parameter estimate by the standard error to obtain a statistically significant value. 
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common resolution stage). Resolution during the pre-suit period, through 
arbitration, or during or after the trial led to increased payments. The length of 
time to disposition and the presence of an allegation of a misdiagnosis did not 
affect the size of payments, whereas severity had a positive effect (both 
statistically and substantially) on the size of the payment. 
Taken together, the results presented in Tables 10 and 11 suggest that the 
resolution stages were not merely markers of the inevitable progression of a 
claim from incident to disposition. Instead, each resolution stage presented a 
different opportunity to resolve the claim. The specific mechanisms set forth in 
these stages, such as the discovery component in the pre-suit stage, or the 
defendant’s ability to admit fault and submit to arbitration on damages in the 
arbitration stage, allowed for new opportunities for resolution. It should be 
noted that the variance explained by the stage of resolution, misdiagnosis, 
severity, and time to disposition explains a great more of the variance in the 
probability of resolution than the payment amount. This simply suggests that 
the stage of resolution has a larger causal effect on the probability of payment 
than the size of payment. 
IX 
MEGA AWARDS AND STAGES OF RESOLUTION 
It is important to investigate the nature of medical-malpractice claims that 
lead to very large payments because these are often the claims identified as 
evidence of the medical-malpractice “crisis.” Figure 8 reports the number of 
million-dollar cases by incident and disposition year. The number of million-
dollar claims peaked in 1996 and in 2003 and 2004. Keep in mind, however, 
even in the peak years, the sheer number of claims with payments exceeding a 
million dollars was low as compared to the total number of claims resulting in 
some payment. 
Figure 8: Million-Dollar Claims 
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 On average, the settlements took just over a year (395 days) to be reported 
and 3.6 years to be disposed (1,325 days). 
Not surprisingly, the majority of claims with million-dollar payments 
involved higher-severity injuries; in fact, million-dollar claims made up more 
than ten percent of level 7 claims and thirteen percent of level 8 claims. The 
correlation between higher severity levels and higher payments is expected; 
logically, injuries that are more serious generated greater costs. 
Table 12: Severity Level of Claims Resulting in Payments of One Million 
Dollars or More 
Severity 
Level 
Resolved Claims Resulting in 
Payments of One Million 
Dollars or More 
Total Resolved 
Claims 
Percent of Total 
Resolved Claims 
1 19 3,178 1% 
2 9 3,614 0% 
3 37 10,654 0% 
4 39 6,192 1% 
5 74 8,353 1% 
6 176 6,571 3% 
7 329 3,443 10% 
8 332 2,558 13% 
9 509 16,932 3% 
 
There are interesting patterns in the resolution stages of million-dollar plus 
awards. Although million-dollar payments can occur at any stage of the 
resolution process, the vast majority (sixty-eight percent) of these “mega 
awards” were agreed to before or during the mandatory settlement conference. 
Table 13 demonstrates that the million-dollar payments resolved before the 
official pre-suit period or through arbitration had a significantly lower 
maximum payment, suggesting that using arbitration to settle disputes—even 
large disputes—or engaging in pre-claim offers coincided with the less severe of 
the large claims. The high number of claims resolved through the mandatory 
settlement conference suggests that high-value claims benefit from 
institutionalized ADR requirements. 
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Table 13: Million-Dollar Claims, Stage of Resolution, and Summary 
Statistics 
 Claims 
Modal 
Severity 
Time to 
Reporting 
(days) 
Time to  
Disposition 
(days) 
Average 
Indemnity  
Paid 
Maximum 
Indemnity  
Paid 
Pre-claim 12 9 150 586 $1,631,036 $3,055,250 
Official Pre-suit 
Period 
199 9 308 732 $2,553,098 $42,400,000 
Arbitration 82 9 342 844 $2,303,231 $16,300,000 
Mandatory 
Settlement Period 
998 9 407 1401 $2,063,796 $50,100,000 
After Trial 165 9 450 1981 $2,754,318 $34,200,000 
 
Claims that resulted in a payout of a million dollars or more had rates of 
misdiagnoses (thirty-four percent) that were similar to claims resolved during 
the mandatory settlement period. The average payment did not differ greatly 
between those claims involving misdiagnoses and those without an allegation of 
misdiagnosis.80 Million-dollar claims involved a wide variety of issues, including 
severe medical issues that were inappropriately allowed to escalate to 
untreatable levels; issues with wrongful births, pregnancies, and labor; and 
accusations of unnecessary surgeries or treatments.81 The vast majority of 
million-dollar payouts occurred following deaths or very severe, life-altering 
injuries. 
X 
CONCLUSIONS 
The profile of the settlements of Florida medical-malpractice claims 
included in this article provides a structure with which any proposals for ADR 
must contend. The findings do not provide an argument against ADR. Medical-
malpractice disputes are painful for patients and medical providers. Any new 
way of resolving claims in a more expeditious and less adversarial way should 
be strongly encouraged. 
At the same time, proponents of alternative resolution mechanisms must 
take into account two important lessons: First, causality and negligence are 
frequently unclear at the beginning of the claims process. Investigation, and 
often formal discovery, is required to identify the issues around which the claim 
is made. Frequently, the facts are ambiguous and contestable, especially at the 
beginning of the dispute. Second, statutes, court rules, and case law provide a 
structure intended to facilitate resolution as efficiently as possible, without 
resorting to a trial. The data presented in this article suggest that a variety of 
resolution mechanismspre-suit discovery, optional arbitration, and pre-suit 
 
 80. The average payment for claims without an allegation of misdiagnosis was $2,327,079, 
compared to $2,286,743 for claims alleging misdiagnosis, a difference that is not statistically significant. 
 81. Tracking System, supra note 22. 
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settlement conferencesprovide new opportunities for the parties in a medical-
malpractice case to resolve their claims. 
The data show that many claims are closed without payment to the claimant. 
Informal investigation or formal discovery may reveal that medical negligence 
did not occur—at least in a legal sense—or that the costs of pursuing the claim 
were likely to be high in comparison to the probable amount of recovered 
damages. Nevertheless, in these instances, mediation or some other form of 
ADR might provide a sense of “healing” or “closure” for the plaintiff–patient 
and perhaps for the defendant–medical provider. Those claims that do result in 
payment are often closed relatively early. Indeed, the majority of settlements, 
regardless of the payment size, never reach the stage of a formal trial. 
The analyses in this article have underplayed the potential role of mediation 
in the settlement process simply because the closed-claim files do not report 
mediation outcomes. Yet mediation must play some role in the settlement 
process because of the Florida statute requiring mediation within 120 days for 
all claims resulting in the formal filing of a lawsuit.82 Further research to uncover 
the influence of mediation on the eventual settlements would benefit our 
understanding of the resolution process. Often, mediation does not result in an 
immediate settlement; but the exchange of information during the session 
allows parties to examine the other side’s viewpoint. There are generally no 
clear rules to the content of mediation: It may focus merely on an exchange of 
information, or it may serve as a forum for venting feelings as well as 
exchanging information. Most ADR discussion emphasizes the palliative effect 
of emotional expression. In fact, mediation sessions of medical-malpractice 
cases in North Carolina fit more closely with the information-exchange model 
than the emotional-venting model. The lawyers are in control and make formal 
presentations through PowerPoint and “day in the life” films. Even when the 
plaintiff and defendant are present, they may not participate directly in the 
session. This is in direct contrast to the assumed emotional-venting and healing 
goals of many ADR proposals.83 More research is needed on the subject of 
mandatory mediation, including the effects of different mediation models on 
the perceived legitimacy of the outcome and the palliative effects on the 
participants. In any event, mediation should be viewed as a possible silent factor 
in the stages and outcomes described in this article: the extent of its role in 
settlements is unclear, including its role in the many instances in which plaintiffs 
abandon claims, or its effect on the satisfaction or dissatisfaction of plaintiffs 
and defendants. 
By providing clear profiles for the types of claims resolved through a variety 
of mechanisms and stages, this research contributes several important lessons to 
the study of ADR and medical malpractice. First, providing a variety of pretrial 
 
 82. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 83. This is based on the personal observations of Professor Vidmar, who has observed medical-
malpractice mediations in North Carolina. 
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mechanisms for resolution allows a diversity of parties to resolve their claims. 
Second, regulatory mechanisms that provide an incentive for discussion (like 
mediation and arbitration) or discovery (like Florida’s pre-suit period) produce 
a variety of results, in terms of the type of claims that are resolved, the 
likelihood of payment, and the size of payment. Third, not all ADR 
mechanisms are equal, in terms of the number of claims that will be resolved 
through the method or in terms of the results produced through those 
resolutions. Advocates of ADR should carefully consider the usefulness of a 
resolution mechanism to both the plaintiff and the defendant before arguing for 
its implementation. 
 
